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Our purpose in this article is to explore the intimate relation betwee n
perception and meaning I . By way of introduction, I would like to note one
very important fact that bears directly on the nature of meaning ; namely, tha t
every human being has a body. To be human is to be embodied, and our bodil y
interactions set out the contours of our world as we experience it . Consequent-
ly, the very possibility of our experiencing anything as meaningful depend s
upon the character of our bodily experience. What we can experience, what i t
can mean to us, how we understand that experience, and how we reason abou t
it are all integrally tied up with our bodily being .
This is precisely what we should expect as we focus on the relation of
perception and meaning. We are all animals trying to survive and thrive withi n
our ever-changing environment. In order to do this well we must perform a n
enormous number of highly structured sensorimotor activities . For instance, we
must be able to identify objects, persons, and events, which involves recog-
nizing recurring patterns as significant and meaningful . We have to manipulate
objects and to move our bodies in ways that coordinate perceptual structure s
with complex motor programs. We must move our bodies through space
without reflective thought, in order to accomplish tasks necessary for our sur -
vival . And we must interact socially with our fellow beings, who share and co -
create our material and social environment . It should consequently come as no
surprise that our bodily experience and activity play a crucial role in definin g
our meaningful existence .
The point I want to make is that meaning cannot be separated from th e
structures of our embodied perceptual interactions and movements. If we did
not have the bodies we do, or if they were somehow radically different than
they are now, then we would not create, understand, and communicat e
meaning in the way we do .
1 . The Objectivist Vlew of Meaning and Reaso n
The view of the intimate and inextricable link between structures o f
perception and meaning, as described above, is not compatible with th e
received " objectivist " view of meaning that underlies much of contemporary
semantics (cf. Johnson 1987 : XXI-XXV) . Semantic objectivism consists
typically of a number of commonly-held, interrelated views about the worl d
and cognition :
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The Objectivist View of Meaning
(1) The world consists of mind-independent objects that have determinate
properties and stand in definite relations to each other . The nature of these
objects is independent of the ways in which people experience and understan d
them .
(2) Meaning is an abstract relation between symbolic representations
(either words or mental representations) and objective (i .e ., mind-inde-
pendent) reality. These symbols are arbitrary and meaningless in themselves ,
but they are supposedly given meaning by virtue of their capacity to co rrespond
to things, properties, and relations existing objectively "in the world . "
(3) Meaning is sentential (propositional) and truth-conditional . Providing
the meaning for a particular utterance or sentence consists of stipulating th e
conditions under which it would be true, or the conditions under which i t
would be "satisfied" by some state of affairs in the world . Such a view seeks a
recursive theory that shows how we can build up larger true or satisfied units
from smaller units, which are taken as semantic primitives .
(4) Meaning is fundamentally literal . Literal concepts or terms are, by
definition, simply those entities whose meanings specify conditions of satisfac-
tion for the objects, properties, and relations they designate . It follows tha t
there can be no irreducibly figurative or metaphorical concepts, because meta-
phorical projections cut across basic experiential domains, and such cross -
categorical projections are held to have no counterparts in the real world ,
which supposedly has discrete and definite categorical boundaries .
(5) Objectivism clearly distinguishes meaning from understanding .
Meaning is held to be objective and in no way dependent on any person's o r
community's understanding or grasp of it. A term has meaning objectively, b y
virtue of its relation to the world, and not because somebody happens t o
understand it in a particular fashion . It follows, according to this view, that a
theory of meaning is not the same as a theory of human understanding .
(6) Finally, reason is regarded as a transcendent, self-sufficient, ahistorica l
structure that exists independently of any particular mind or historica l
instantiation of it . The core of this objective rationality is delineated by forma l
logic and is held to be entirely value-neutral and free of emotional an d
imaginative dimensions . Rationality is "disembodied" in the sense that i t
consists of pure abstract logical relations and operations which are independen t
of subjective processes and sensorimotor experiences in the bodily organism .
Reasoning is thus seen as the rule-governed manipulation of symbols that are
meaningless in themselves but attain their meaning through their objectiv e
relations to states of affairs in the world. It consists of a series of operations i n
which connections among symbols and rule-governed combinations of symbol s
are established and traced out according to various logical principles .
This "Symbol Manipulation" or "Language of Thought" (Fodor 1981) vie w
of meaning supports the dominant metaphor of contemporary cognitive
science ; namely, THE MINI) IS A COMPUTER PROGRAM . Reasoning is treated as a
program that can be run on any suitable hardware . Neither the structure of
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2 . Cognitive Semantics : The Embodiment of Meaning
Objectivist semantics is actually more misleading than it is helpful . It i s
bad metaphysics, bad epistemology, bad psychology, bad linguistics, and ba d
cognitive science
. These criticisms can be illustrated by a consideration of the
picture of human cognition that objectivism presupposes . Objectivism takes
the world to be a pre-given collection of determinate objects that are distinc t
from the subjects who experience them
. The body is thus regarded as a mere
mechanical transducer that translates input signals from the external worl d
into output signals that are picked up by our minds as symbolic representations .
This rigid subject-object dichotomy creates the epistemological problem of
figuring out how we can be sure that our mental representations really do map
onto the external physical world from which we are separated
. Hence, we are
caught up inescapably in a web of sceptical problems about the possibility o f
knowledge .
Even worse, no mention is made of the role of biology, that is, of th e
importance of the organism's embodiment in the structures of its system of
meaning
. Objectivism makes virtually no mention of imaginative processe s
(such as metaphor, metonymy, concept formation, schemata, and categorie s
whose structures are imaginative rather than actually present in the external
world) that are grounded in our bodily experience and are central to meanin g
and rationality. No theory of meaning, rationality, or knowledge influentia l
today allocates any central place to imagination. In fact, objectivists have
never known what to do with imagination, because it does not correspond to
their notions of pure meaning and reason, and it is not formalizable in th e
requisite logical fashion . And since imagination is very much dependent upo n
our physical, linguistic, and cultural interactions and orientations, it is no
surprise that human embodiment has mattered little or not at all in objectivis t
and "Language of Thought" theories of meaning and rationality .
In striking contrast to this objectivist view of meaning and reason, researc h
in " cognitive semantics " (Lakoff 1987 ; Langacker 1986 ; Johnson 1987) ha s
come to recognize the central role played by our physical embodiment, ou r
nonpropositional understanding, and our imaginative structuring in the way w e
experience, make sense of, and communicate our sense of reality . A theory of
meaning is a theory of understanding, where 'understanding' is our way of bein g
in and experiencing our world . Such understanding is something we do with
our whole unified embodied mentality through perception, manipulation,
movement, and conscious and unconscious acts of organizing and unifying .
Much of this understanding is imaginative activity that is neither sententia l
nor strictly logical in the objectivist sense, yet understanding of this sort is th e
basis for our ability to make sense of things and to reason about them .
Cognitive semantics pursues the hypothesis that the alleged "higher "
cognitive functions that are supposed to make meaning and reasoning possible
are indeed continuous with and inseparable from our sensorimotor activities.
This thesis of the intimate connection between perceptual and semanti c
structures is not new. Dewey (1981 : 207-222) was quite explicit about just suc h
a connection, 2 Merleau-Potty (1962) explored the role of what he called the
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"phenomenal body" in the development of meaning, and Patricia Churchland
has recently argued that :
. . . it seems to me quite possible that some capacities hitherto considered strictly
cognitive may be discovered to share fundamental elements with paradigmatic moto r
skills . (1986 : 449 )
What is new in cognitive semantics is the way in which it has been able to
be more concrete and specific about the way in which structures of our percep-
tual interactions work their way up into our understanding of more abstrac t
conceptual domains . A comprehensive treatment of such processes is obviousl y
going to be quite complex . At present we have only a sketch of what such an
account would involve . However, in order to provide some idea of the types of
imaginative processes that connect perception and meaning, I would like to
examine briefly the nature and role of what George Lakoff and I (1980) hav e
called an " image schema . "
3 . The Role of Image Schemata in Meaning
Consider, for example, the nature of our perceptual horizon . During the first
days of its life out of the womb, the infant gradually develops its visual focusin g
abilities . It learns to direct its attention toward areas within its visual field an d
to highlight a figure against a background that fades off into an indefinite per-
ceptual horizon on its periphery . In order to survive and to flourish, animals
must realize such focusing skills, and whatever occupies the center of the percep -
tual horizon tends to become more important than that which is peripheral, at
least for the brief moments that it occupies center stage. Our perceptual expe-
rience, then, always manifests the same recurring schematic structure consistin g
of a focal center surrounded by a horizon that fades off into an indeterminate
periphery. Visually, we might diagram this imaginative structure as follows :
CENTER-PERIPHERY
This CENTER-PERIPHERY structure of perceptual experience holds for all of
our sensory modes, not simply for vision . As my attention is directed to the
voice on the telephone, I cease to be aware of the fan humming in the
computer on my desk, but I can later shift the center of my attention back t o
the hum and away from the voice . What is central can become peripheral an d
what was peripheral can become central .
In this way, a CENTER-PERIPHERY pattern structures virtually all ou r
perceptual experience, and it constitutes one of the fundamental imaginative
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contours of our embodied experience of our world. The CENTER-PERIPHER Y
schema is crucial to our most basic preconceptual understanding of our world ,
and it concerns the way in which our world grows up around us as an arena o f
our meaningful action . The CENTER-PERIPHERY structure is an image schema . I t
is a continuous structure or pattern of an organizing activity of imagination b y
means of which we order and unify our perceptions, motor programs, spatial
orientations, temporal sequences, and so forth . Such structures are what we
bring to our experience and understanding in an anticipatory fashion, but the y
are also transformed in and through their appearance in our ever-changing ,
ongoing concrete experience .
An image schema is thus neither an abstract, finite proposition or concept
(such as a propositional definition of the FIGURE-GROUND or CENTER-PERIPHER Y
pattern), nor is it a concrete, rich image (such as a mental image of a center-
periphery diagram) . It is, rather, an evolving pattern of our imaginatively
structured experience as it is organized with a center-periphery orientation .
4. Metaphorical Extensions of Image Schemata
As art imaginative construct, an image schema is never tied merely to it s
perceptual manifestations. It can be related to the structure of our understand-
ing of more abstract domains of our experience, usually by means of imagi-
native metaphoric and metonymic projections . Given the CENTER-PERIPHERY
structuring of our perception, in addition to the tremendous importance of
perception as a basis for our knowledge, it should be no surprise that th e
CENTER-PERIPHERY schema is also epistemically central to our understanding of
more abstract domains of experience, such as the social, political, moral, an d
logical dimensions . Just as a visual or auditory horizon fades away from the
center of our perceptual field, so a conceptual or epistemic horizon also fades
off from the focal point of our knowledge . Just as whatever occupies the cente r
of our perceptual field tends to be most clearly delineated and considered a s
most important at the moment, so the focus of our intellectual insight is also
that which is most important for our knowledge . In the epistemic realm, for
example, we speak of that which is central to a viewpoint, of the importance of
the central tenets of a position, of the central insights of a theory, and of the focu s
of our attention in a theory . In each case, that which is most cognitivel y
"central " is that which is most epistemically important. The structure of the
CENTER-PERIPHERY schema in the perceptual domain is thus carried over b y
metaphorical extension into the logic of the abstract epistemic domain .
This conception of knowledge is so basic for us that we are hardly eve r
aware that it rests on at least two fundamental metaphors and one imag e
schema. The metaphors are : (1) UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (as in, " I see wha t
you mean," "I've lost sight of the main thesis, " " Your argument just isn't dear to
me, " " Could you shed more light on the issue ?")3 and (2) THE VISUAL. HELD IS A
CONTAINER (as in, " The space shuttle is just coming into view, " "The ship is
completely out of sight now," "I've lost him now, the building is in the way ") .
The image schema structures both our visual field and its metaphorical projec-
tion onto the epistemic domain .
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The idea that whatever is central is most important depends upon these
two metaphors and one image schema in the following way : our visual field i s
organized as a bounded space with a CENTER-PERIPHERY orientation .
Understanding and knowing are conceived, by means of the UNDERSTANDING IS
SEEING metaphor, as modes of (intellectual) insight . The epistemic domain i s
thus understood metaphorically as a contained region with a CENTER-PERIPHERY
structure . In this way, the logic of our visual experience is mapped onto ou r
understanding of knowledge, based upon the shared CENTER-PERIPHERY image
schema. This metaphorical projection from the domain of visual experience t o
that of epistemic activity gives rise to the following mappings :
- the visual field maps onto the domain of knowledge ;
- the object in a visual field maps onto an idea/concept ;
- visual focus maps onto cognitive attention ;
- ambient light maps onto the 'light' of reason ;
- clear vision maps onto intellectual insight ;
- a visually important object maps onto an epistemically significant idea .
Since that which is perceptually central is most important, then that which i s
cognitively central is epistemically most important .
By means of metaphors and image schemata such as these, we are able to
make sense of highly abstract or indeterminate aspects of our experience on th e
basis of constantly recurring structures of our shared sensorimotor activity . Ou r
most abstract patterns of understanding and reasoning are prefigured in bodil y
experiences, by virtue of which we are able to inhabit a shared, meaningful
world . In politics, for example, the central issues are the most important and
receive the greatest attention . Socially, someone may seek to occupy center
stage . The central committee holds the greatest power and influence . The
morally important concerns are the focus of our attention. That which is on the
fringe is far less important than that which is central .
Epistemic centrality and perceptual centrality are thus very closely relate d
via the center-periphery image schema . The same kind of organizationa l
pattern connects these two diverse domains of understanding, which turn out
to be far more closely related, through metaphor, than we might at first have
suspected. This intimate relationship is no accident, given the kinds of bodie s
we have, the way in which our brains work, the purposes and values we share as
necessary for survival and the enhancement of the quality of our experience ,
and the nature of the tasks we undertake . We experienced the world meaning -
fully before we acquired language, both as a species and in our individual
growth, so that there is an existential and cognitive continuity between ou r
perceptual and theoretical understanding . Linguistic meaning is thereby
prefigured in prelinguistic patterns of significant movement, perceptual inter -
action, gesture, practices, and communicative interactions.
5 . Implications for a Theory of Meaning
My brief account of the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema is intended only as a n
illustration of a representative image-schematic structure of imagination . A
comprehensive account would need to include at least the following basic image
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schemata : OBJECT, CONTAINER, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, BALANCE, CYCLE, FORCE
(INCLUDING ATTRACTION, RESISTANCE, COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, POTENTIAL), UP
DOWN, SCALARITY, ITERATION, etc. (see Johnson 1987 ; Lakoff 1987) . All of these
interrelated structures together mark out the contours of our understanding ,
both of physical and of abstract domains. It might seem as though this list o f
image schemata could go on indefinitely, like Plato's problem of whether there
are Forms for everything, including hair and dirt. However, the list of basi c
schemata of this sort is, in fact, relatively small . Many apparently distinct image
schemata turn out to be projections on, or elaborations of, more basic schemata .
For example, the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema provides a framework for th e
instantiation of a large number of secondary structures . Because we see ourselves
as lying at the center of our experiential horizon, we can map a number o f










and, in conjuction with the container schema :
inner outer
mine not min e
core periphery
Furthermore, much of our semantic structure is based upon the possibl e
metaphorical extensions of the most basic image schemata . A physical object
may thus be the center of my visual attention, while (metaphorically) a key
concept may be central to my theory. Objects that are too far away are hard to
see clearly, while ideas that are too far out are hard to understand . In this way, i t
becomes possible for us imaginatively to create an extensive semantic structure
on the basis of very modest image-schematic resources .
We can now see why Objectivist semantics misses so much of what i s
important in human understanding and reasoning . Objectivism treats sche-
matic structure as though it could fit into a traditional Symbol Manipulation
model of cognition . In fact, David Rumelhart's early work on schema theory
was of this character, defining "schema" as "generalized knowledge about a
sequence of events" (1977 : 165), as illustrated by Shank and Abselson's notion
of a scripted activity (1977) . Serious problems with this Symbol Manipulation
model of a schema eventually led Rumelhart to view a schema as a property o f
an entire neural network, and thus not as a fixed thing :
Schemata are not explicit entities, but rather are implicit in our knowledge and are
created by the very environment that they are trying to interpret-as it is interpretin g
them . (Rumelhart 1986 : 20)
Ulrich Neisser (1976) has emphasized the embodied nature of schemata
and their intimate connection to sensorimotor programs :
A schema is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle which is internal to th e
perceiver, modifiable by experience, and somehow specific to what is being perceived .
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The schema accepts information as it becomes available at sensory surfaces and i s
changed by that information; it directs movements and exploratory activities that make
more information available, by which it is further modified . (54)
Neisser's view is distinctive because it captures the nature of the schema a s
a malleable structure of perception and motor activity . Such structures do not
operate prepositionally in the Objectivist sense, even though they may play a
role in our propositionally expressed knowledge insofar as they constrai n
inferences . This use of "schema" is similar to Kant's, who described it as a
structure of imagination that connects concepts with percepts . He charac-
terized schemes as "procedures for constructing images" and thus saw them a s
involving perceptual patterns in bodily experience (Kant [1781] 1965) . It i s
this crucial embodied dimension that has been ignored by recent schem a
theory.
It should now be more evident how cognitive semantics transforms th e
notion of meaning considerably in contrast with Objectivist semantics . A
theory of meaning is a theory of understanding, and understanding is the
totality of the ways in which we experience and make sense of our world in a n
ever-evolving process. Understanding is not achieved merely by entertainin g
and reflecting on sentential/propositional structure alone . Rather, from birth
we develop an understanding of our world through our bodily encounters, usin g
the sensorimotor capacities available to us, and all of this perceptual inpu t
affects our grasp of anything whatever as meaningful .
According to this theory, adequate semantic analysis will involve at leas t
two basic kinds of structures : (1) biologically-based, image-schematic structure s
tied to our sensorimotor experience within an ever-changing environment, and
(2) imaginative structures -metaphors, metonymies, radial categories -
(Lakoff 1987) by means of which we make and extend semantic and epistemi c
connections . There is no rock-bottom literal core that maps onto objective
reality, as the theorists of Objectivism maintain . Instead, what appears to fi t
Objectivist models does so because it is based on sensorimotor experience an d
imaginative connections to it within relatively stable environments an d
contexts. What Objectivists treat as the "literal core" is actually only a con-
ventionalized and tentatively stabilized meaning structure that is dependent o n
our context, interests, purposes, and values ; as a result, it is not at all absolute
or foundational .
There are, of course, symbols in Cognitive Semantics, but they do no t
have the characteristics attributed to them by the "Language of Thought "
view-they are not finitary and meaningless unstructured symbols that attai n
meaning solely by being placed in an objective relation to a mind-independen t
reality. Instead, they have an analog character, they have an internal logi c
(based on their internal structure), and they are meaningful because of th e
manner in which they arise in our sensorimotor experience and because of th e
way in which they can be projected in our understanding of abstract domains .
We began our study with the important question of the relation of
perception and meaning. The answer provided by Cognitive Semantics to thi s
question can now be summarized as follows : we are embodied, imaginative
animals from our sensory receptors up to our highest forms of logical reasoning .
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The contours and structures of our bodily (sensorimotor) experience of ou r
world influence our understanding of the most abstract, nonphysical domains ,
principally by means of metaphoric projections based on image-schemati c
structure . Our "bodily" understanding and our "conceptual" or "propo-
sitional" understanding are thus intimately related. Linguistic meaning does
not exist as an independent entity generated by some language module in our
cognitive apparatus . Instead, it is a specification of our general capacity t o
experience our world, and aspects of it, as meaningful, given the nature of ou r
bodies, our purposes, our goals, and our values . What we perceive as meaningfu l
within our environmental context is very much the basis for what can b e
meaningful for us at the level of language . And language, in turn, adds even
more possibilities for the articulation of meaning, and thereby for a riche r




This article was first presented as a paper at a conference entitled " Meaning and Perception ",
Universitt du Quebec 3 Montreal, May 17-20, 1989 .
2 Dewey notes that " The brain, the last physical organ of thought, is a part of the same
practical machinery for bringing about adaptation of the environment to the life requirement s
of the organism, to which belong legs and hand and eye " (1981 : 214) .
3 For an extended treatment of the UNDERSTANDING I5 SEEING metaphor, see Eve Sweetse r
(1989).
This essay was written while I was supported by a fellowship from the American Council of
Learned Societies for 1989-90. I am grateful to the Council for the opportunity to explore th e
relation of our bodily experience to meaning and inference .
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ABSTRACT
According to a new program known as "Cognitive Semantics," there exists an intimat e
relation between perception and meaning. The allegedly " higher" cognitive functions that
construct meaning and make reasoning possible are continuous with and inseparable from our
sensorimotor activities . I explore the nature of an "image schema" as the basic imaginative
structure that connects our embodied experience with our understanding of abstract domains and
acts of inference . This account indicates the ways in which standard objectivist theories o f
meaning, knowledge, and rationality fail to capture crucial dimensions of our cognitive experience .
RESUM E
Scion le nouveau programme de recherche catrnu sous le nom de " semantique cognitive", it
existe un rapport &roil. enrre la perception et la signification. Les functions cognitives dices
" superieures ", qui servent h is construction du lens et permetrent le raisonnement, sont e n
continuit6 avec les activitSs sensori-morrices, dont elles soot insEparables . Nous presenrons et
developpons, clans car article, la notion de "schema d ' image" (image schema) tongue comae
structure imaginative de base connectant noire experience, ancree clans le corps, avec notr e
comprehension des domain= abstraits et nos acres d ' inference. Nous rendons compre ainsi des
raisons pour lesquelles Ies theories objet tivistes standard de In signification, de la connaissance et
de Is rarionalite n' arrivent pas h saisir certaines dimensions, essentielles, de notre experienc e
cognitive .
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lexeme verbal "avancer "
Peter STOCKINGER
(C.N.R .S ., I.Na.L.C.O., Paris )
1) Bxemples et objectify
Nous voudrions examiner da ps cet article plusieurs usages du lexeme




ii) Jean avarice vets Pans
iii) Jean avarice wle chaise vers la table
iv) Jean avarice l'heure de son depart
v) Jean avarice son depart
vi) La nuit avarice
vii) Jean avcrsce 100 francs a Paul
viii) Jean avarice un argumen t
ix) Jean avance dons son travai l
x) Jean avarice son travail
xi) La montre avarice
xi i) Le bait on atone de deuxmares sur le mur.
Nous souhaitons demontrer, par 1'analyse de ces enonces, les points suivants :
1) Its differents usages du lexeme en question peuvent tune ramenes 'A un
scheme canonique sous-jacent ;
2) le scheme canonique sous-jacent possede une organisation telle qu'il
peut rendre compte aussi bien des contsaintes spatio-temporelles et perceptive s
que conventionnelles des usages du lexeme " avancer ' ;
3) le scheme canonique determine le processus de l'analogisation menant
des usages dits contras aux usages dits figures ;
4) le scheme canonique reunit, enfin, les conditions necessaires pour l a
constitution dune sorte de "grammaire" ElCmentaire des syntagmes narratifs o u
flgllt, val . 9 (1989), n' 1-L3 C Assocladco canadlenne de shnriorique/Caradian Semiotic Association
